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We study the effect of entrepreneurs’ wealth allocations on their firm level 
capital structure by using a sample of small privately owned firms from the 2003 
Surveys of Small Business Finance. We find that financial leverage decreases as 
entrepreneurs allocate more wealth on their firm investments. We also find that 
wealth allocation only affects capital structure in limited liability firms. Lastly, we 
show that the effect of wealth allocation on capital structure does not disappear 
after adjusting for collateral and personal guarantees.  
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Capital structure is one of the most important issues in corporate finance 
because it leads to the firm’s valuation and its cost of capital. Extant empirical 
literature has focused primarily on publicly traded firms. However, according to 
Kobe (2007), small privately owned firms account for about 50% of non-farm real 
GDP and 50% of the job growth in the period from 1998 to 2004. Although small 
privately owned firms are a critical part of the overall economy, their capital 
structure is a relatively under-explored issue in literature.  
Moreover, according to Girard (2009), under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) granted by Congress, the U.S. government has 
spent more than $1.6 trillion dollars bailing out big business, such as AIG, Citi, 
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. However, small businesses, as an important part of 
the overall economy, are also facing credit constraints. It is important for us to 
pay serious attention to small businesses. Research on the capital structure 
determinants in these firms is desirable because capital structure affects cost of 
capital, which eventually affects the survival and growth of small privately owned 
firms.   
Extant literature has attempted to explain the observed capital structure as 
a result of bankruptcy costs, tax shields, adverse selection, and agency conflicts. 
However, few studies have examined the link between firms’ capital structure 





) in private firms own significant portions of their firms and 
face fewer governance constraints. Thus their tolerance of losing their firm 
investments might play a significant role in determining the amounts of financial 
leverage
2
 on the firm level. In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature 
by studying the effect of decision makers’ wealth allocations on firm-level capital 
structure.  
Entrepreneurs tend to have a significant portion of their personal wealth 
invested in their firms, which could be lost in the event of bankruptcy. Thus the 
allocation of entrepreneurs’ wealth invested in their firms relative to other 
investments can affect their incentives to borrow at the firm level. When firms are 
incorporated and have limited liability, the personal wealth that entrepreneurs 
(principal owners) allocate outside of the firms is protected from the claims of 
firms’ creditors in case of bankruptcy. As entrepreneurs allocate larger 
proportions of their wealth outside of their firms, they have more incentives to use 
financial leverage at the firm level because their loss is smaller in case of 
bankruptcy. In contrast, the larger the proportions of entrepreneurs’ wealth 
invested in their firms, the lower the incentives they have to use financial leverage 
because of the greater loss in case of bankruptcy. Thus, we hypothesize that, in 
limited liability firms, firm-level financial leverage is negatively correlated with 
the entrepreneurs’ proportional wealth invested in their firms. We focus on 
limited liability firms rather than all small privately owned firms because we do 
not expect a wealth allocation effect in unlimited liability firms. In unlimited 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, principal owner refers to the largest shareholder of the firm.  
2
 Financial leverage is defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets in this paper.  
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liability firms, both decision makers’ firm investments and out-of-firms assets are 
subject to the claims of firms’ creditors in case of firm bankruptcy. Thus, their 
total wealth is tied to the firms.  
The 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance (SSBF) provides 
information on both firm-level capital structure and firm decision-makers’ 
personal wealth. We test our hypothesis by using data on limited liability firms 
from SSBF 2003 and find results consistent with our prediction. With limited 
liability protection, firms tend to use more financial leverage as the entrepreneurs 
allocate more wealth outside of their firms. This result remains unchanged after 
we adjust our measure of wealth allocation by the amount of loans that 
entrepreneurs obtain by using personal guarantees or out-of-firm personal assets 
as collateral. As a robustness test, we also test our hypothesis on a larger sample 
that includes both limited liability firms and unlimited liability firms. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, we find that wealth allocation only affects the capital 
structure of limited liability firms. Moreover, our tests show that wealth allocation 
does not play a significant role in determining the capital structure of unlimited 
liability firms.  
We contribute to the literature by studying an under-explored issue, which 
is the relation between entrepreneurs’ wealth allocations and their firm-level 
capital structure. Compared to Cole (2008), we show that wealth allocation, which 
has been previously almost ignored in the literature, plays an important role in 
determining capital structure in privately owned firms that have limited liability. 
Mueller (2008) suggests that financial leverage increases as entrepreneurs invest 
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more wealth in their firms because of higher cost of equity. Our analysis offers an 
alternative hypothesis. We present evidence that is consistent with our prediction. 
We further differentiate our work from Mueller’s by showing that wealth 
allocation only affects capital structure when firms have limited liability. Our data 
sample is more representative of the population because we include the book 
insolvent firms that account for 16% of the total firms. In addition, we control for 
the fact that 16% of the SSBF 2003 firms are constrained in obtaining credits.  
 
II. Literature Review 
Modern capital structure theory begins with the work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) on capital structure irrelevancy. They suggest that in the absence of 
corporate taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, and information asymmetry, 
capital structure does not have any effect on market the value of a firm.  
 In Modigliani and Miller’s framework, investors and firms have equal 
access to financial markets. Investors can invest in either a levered firm or an 
unlevered firm. If they invest in the unlevered firm, they can borrow the same 
amount of money at the same cost of capital that the levered firm does. The 
levered cash flows the investors receive are not different from those they receive 
if they invest in the unlevered firm. Consequently, the value of the levered firm is 
not different from the value of the unlevered one.   
By relaxing the assumptions in the Modigliani and Miller framework, 
several alternative capital structure theories have been developed. For example, 
when corporate tax is added to the capital structure irrelevancy framework, 
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Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest that firms should use 100% debt financing 
because the use of debt financing provides firms with tax shields. Additionally, 
when both corporate tax and bankruptcy costs exist, Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973) suggest that there is an optimal leverage level for the firm when the 
marginal benefit of tax shields is equal to the marginal expected deadweight costs 
of bankruptcy (i.e., the trade-off theory). The deadweight costs of bankruptcy 
refer to trustee fees, legal fees, and other costs of reorganization or liquidation 
that bankrupt firms must absorb.  The probability of bankruptcy increases as firms 
use more financial leverage. When financial leverage is low, tax shields are more 
valuable to firms than expected deadweight bankruptcy costs. However, as 
financial leverage increases, expected deadweight bankruptcy costs increase at a 
higher rate than the benefit of tax shields does. At equilibrium, the optimal capital 
structure of the firm is achieved when the marginal benefit of tax shields is equal 
to the marginal expected deadweight bankruptcy costs. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) propose an adverse selection model that adds 
information asymmetry to the capital structure irrelevancy proposition. In their 
framework, managers know better about the true values of their firms than 
outsiders. Moreover, managers act in the best interest of the existing shareholders. 
Myers and Majluf show that managers issue equity only when they believe that 
their firms are overvalued by the market. However, rational outside investors 
interpret the new issue of equity as a negative signal and discount firms’ values 
accordingly. Thus, outside financing sometimes becomes so expensive that the 
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firms have to pass up some positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects. 
Consequently, managers prefer to use retained earnings when they invest.  
Based on the Myers and Majluf’s model, Myers (1984) suggests that there 
is a pecking order when firms decide their capital structures. Firms first use their 
retained earnings, then debt, and then equity (the pecking order theory). Generally 
firms prefer to use retained earnings because internal financing can avoid 
information asymmetry problems. Outside equity is the most expensive financing 
option because of adverse selection. Myers and Majluf’s original model does not 
formally examine the role of debt. However, Myers argues that debt financing 
should fall between internal financing and equity financing because debtholders 
can claim the firms’ residuals before shareholders in case of default. Therefore, 
the cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity.    
In addition to the above research, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a 
model in which agency conflicts exist not only between managers and 
shareholders, but also between shareholders and debtholders (agency theory). 
Under agency theory, owner-managers who do not own 100% of the equity will 
consume perks at the expense of other shareholders. When owner-managers use 
outside equity financing, monitoring costs occur as a result of the conflict of 
interest between the owner-managers and outside shareholders. Outside 
shareholders are rational and pay the prices for the shares that reflect the 
monitoring costs. Therefore, owner-managers prefer internal financing to outside 
equity financing. An agency problem also exists between shareholders and 
debtholders if owner-managers act primarily on behalf of shareholders. Before 
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new debt is issued, owner-managers promise to invest in low risk projects. After 
they issue debt, they have incentives to replace the low-risk projects with the 
high-risk projects. Only shareholders benefit from the high-risk projects’ payoffs 
in good states of the economy. However, debtholders share the costs of the high-
risk projects’ losses in bad states. Rational debtholders realize this agency conflict 
and include various covenants in the indenture provisions to limit shareholders’ 
behavior, which reduces the value of the debt. Thus owner-managers prefer 
internal financing to debt financing.  
Agency theory does not predict a sequence between debt financing and 
equity financing because the relative importance of the above two agency 
conflicts is unclear. Notwithstanding, we can argue that the firm’s capital 
structure depends on which agency cost is higher. However, the agency costs are 
dynamic factors rather than fixed ones. The agency cost of debt increases as firms 
use more financial leverage. In contrast, the agency cost of equity per dollar 
decreases as firms use more financial leverage. The underlying rationale is that 
the fixed payoffs promised by debt financing show the owner-managers’ 
confidence about their firms and send positive signals to the potential outside 
shareholders. Thus, as debt financing increases, the incentive to use equity 
financing also increases. The capital structure is optimal when the two agency 
conflicts balance. 
The above theories have empirical implications for a number of cross-
sectional variables that could be related to financial leverage. The trade-off theory 
implies a positive relation between leverage and firm size because larger firms are 
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more diversified and have lower default risk. The pecking order theory has 
ambiguous inferences on the relation between leverage and firm size. One 
argument is that larger firms face lower adverse selection and lower cost of debt. 
However, firm size can also be a proxy for sizable retained earnings. Larger firms 
tend to have more retained earnings and thus can use more retained earnings to 
finance projects. Therefore, the relation between leverage and firm size can be 
either positive or negative under the pecking-order theory. Under agency theory, 
one can argue that larger firms have better reputations and lower agency cost of 
debt. Furthermore, it is more likely that mangers in larger firms own smaller 
percentages of the firms and have more incentives to consumer perks. Thus the 
agency cost of equity is higher in larger firms. Therefore, it implies a positive 
relation between leverage and firm size.  
The trade-off theory also suggests that leverage should be negatively 
related to growth options because higher growth firms lose more of their value 
when these firms are financially distressed. However, the pecking order theory 
has an ambiguous prediction on the relation between leverage and growth options. 
Leverage could be positively related to growth options because high growth firms 
have more investments and accumulate more debt over time holding profitability 
constant. Nevertheless, one can also argue that firms with higher growth tend to 
have more information asymmetry and higher cost of debt. According to agency 
theory, it is easier for owner-managers in high growth firms to replace low-risk 
projects with high-risk projects. It is also more difficult for debtholders in high 
growth firms to monitor this substitution behavior. Rational debtholders realize 
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the agency conflicts and discount the value of debt. As a result, agency theory 
implies a negative relation between leverage and growth options. 
In perspective, the trade-off theory suggests that profitable firms should 
use more debt because they have lower expected bankruptcy costs. The pecking 
order theory implies a negative relation between leverage and profitability 
because profitable firms have more retained earnings and use less debt financing, 
when we hold dividend policy constant. Agency theory does not yield a clear 
inference on the relation between leverage and profitability.  
Firms with tangible assets tend to lose less value when they are financially 
distressed. Consequently, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between 
leverage and tangible assets. Under the pecking order theory, firms with more 
tangible assets have fewer information asymmetry problems and lower cost of 
debt and lower cost of equity. Thus, the pecking order theory has an ambiguous 
prediction on the relation between leverage and tangible assets. Agency theory 
implies that financial leverage is positively related to tangible assets because 
tangible assets make it difficult for owner-managers to replace low-risk projects 
with high-risk ones.   
Empirical research has examined extensively the above capital structure 
theories using cross-sectional data on publicly traded firms. For example, Smith 
and Watts (1992) study the correlation between financing policy (financial 
leverage) and the investment opportunity set (growth options) using annual 
Compustat data for the period 1976-1981. They construct five variables to proxy 
for the investment opportunity set including book-to-market ratio; depreciation-
11 
 
to-firm value ratio; research and development (R&D) to firm value ratio; variance 
of return on investment; a dummy variable for regulation; earnings to price ratio; 
and capital expenditures to value ratio. A negative relation is found between these 
measures for the firm’s investment opportunity set and its financial leverage level. 
Their evidence supports the inference of agency theory that firms’ investment 
opportunity set determines financing policies.  
Additionally, Frank and Goyal (2007) examine U.S. firms on annual 
Compustat data for the period from 1950 to 2003. They use four alternative 
measures of leverage including: the ratio of total debt to market value of assets; 
the ratio of total debt to book value of assets; the ratio of long term debt to market 
value of assets; and the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets. In their 
linear regression model, a leverage measure at year t is the dependent variable. 
The right-hand side of the estimation model is a vector of lagged independent 
variables at year t-1: including profitability (ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to total assets); firm size (log of total assets); tangible assets (ratio of 
net property, plant, and equipment to total assets); and growth options (market to 
book ratio).  
Frank and Goyal find that leverage is positively related to tangible assets 
and firm size, but negatively related to growth options and profitability. Their 
results are consistent even when they use different measures of leverage. The 
authors’ conclusion is that these results support the trade-off theory. The 
coefficient of profitability is the only one that has a different sign than implied by 
the trade-off theory. Thus, they argue that profitability can also be a better proxy 
12 
 
for growth options than the market-to-book ratio. In such a case, the negative 
coefficient captures the effect of growth options on leverage predicted by the 
trade-off theory. An alternative explanation of their results is the sticky dividend 
policy. If profitable firms choose to keep the earnings and pay dividends later, 
then the leverage ratio can be lower because the equity is higher holding total 
debts constant.  
Cole (2008) provides the first empirical evidence on the capital structure 
decisions of privately owned firms. He uses data from the 1987, 1993, 1998, and 
2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBF). He defines the following 
variables: (a) leverage as the ratio of total loans to total assets or the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets; (b) firm size as the natural log of total assets; (c) tangible 
assets as the sum of inventory and property, plant and equipment
3
 divided by total 
assets; (d) profitability as the ratio of profit after tax to total assets; (e) growth 
options measured by dummy variables for positive and negative employment 
growth during the previous three years; (f) liquidity defined as cash divided by 
total assets; (g) firm age defined as the log of the firm’s age in years; (h) number 
of commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions from which the firm 
obtains financial services; (i) firm credit-worthiness (whether the firm has been 
delinquent 60 days or more on a business obligation, and whether the firm has 
made payments on a trade credit account late during the past fiscal year); (j) the 
firm’s tax filing status (C-corporations, S-corporations, LLC, LLP, Partnership, or 
Proprietorship); (k) limited liability protection; (l) the owner’s demographic 
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 Property, plant and equipment is only available in SSBF 1987 (data item RIV_A11). This 
variable is not available in SSBF 1993, 1998, and 2003.  
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information (gender and race); and (m) industry effects (whether the firm is in a 
specific two-digit SIC code).   
Cole finds that firm leverage is negatively related to firm size, age, 
profitability, liquidity, and credit-worthiness measures. In his model leverage is 
positively related to firm tangible assets, limited liability, and number of bank and 
non-bank financial service providers. He also finds that female owners use less 
leverage. Cole concludes that in general his evidence is consistent with the 
pecking order theory and inconsistent with the trade-off theory.  
 Additionally, Mueller (2008) examines the effect of entrepreneurs’ shares 
of personal wealth invested in their firms on firm-level leverage. Her sample is a 
group of small private firms from the SSBF 1998 data. She finds that leverage is 
positively related to the share of personal wealth invested in the firm and 
concludes that less diversified entrepreneurs are exposed to more idiosyncratic 
risk. Thus they demand higher returns on their equity investment, suggesting a 
higher cost of equity for their firms. Her point estimates suggest that firm leverage 
increases by 0.75 percentage points as the entrepreneur’s proportional wealth 
invested to the firm increases by 1 percentage point. 
4
 
Mueller’s empirical analysis excludes all book insolvent firms. She argues 
that these firms’ equity values are negative and should be excluded. This limits 
the sample significantly. Book insolvent firms are more than 16% of all the 
limited liability firms in SSBF 1998 and SSBF 2003 respectively. Yet the book 
insolvent firms in 1998 and 2003 were still in operation several months later when 
                                                 
4
 We replicate Mueller’s result in Appendix 1. 
14 
 
the main interview took place
5
. Book insolvent firms may not necessarily have 
negative market equity values. For example, it is possible that these firms are high 
growth firms that do not have many assets in place. Because the denominator, 
book assets, is a proxy for assets-in-place, high growth firms might have book 
leverage ratios greater than one. Excluding the book insolvent firms might 
artificially distort the regression results, because they are the highest levered firms 
and their entrepreneurs are the least diversified. Mueller does not differentiate the 
unlimited liability firms from limited liability ones and includes these unlimited 
liability firms in her main analysis. As a robustness check, she also tests her 
model on limited liability firms. The point estimates are not significantly different 
from those in her main analysis. However, the significance level of the 
coefficients decreases from better than the 1% level to 10% level. 
6
  
Frank and Goyal (2007) suggest that empirical capital structure research 
should differentiate financially constrained firms from unconstrained ones. Small 
privately owned firms are often constrained in obtaining outside debt financing 
(bank loans) due to reasons such as the lack of credit-worthiness. The leverage in 
these small private firms might not be at the level that their owner-managers 
prefer. One can argue that Mueller’s result could have been different if she had 
differentiated financially constrained firms from unconstrained firms.  
The trade-off theory and the pecking order theory tend to make different 
inferences for firm size, growth options, tangible assets, and profitability. Agency 
                                                 
5
 For example, in SSBF 2003, sample firms in the survey reported their financial standings in 
2003. Interviews were carried out in 2004 and 2005.  
6
 Her sample size decreases from 2617 observations to 1406 observations when she excludes 
unlimited liability firms. 
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theory tends to make the same inferences as the trade-off theory. However, the 
underlying reasoning is different for the trade-off theory and agency theory. The 
trade-off theory explains the firm’s capital structure as the equilibrium between 
tax shields and expected deadweight bankruptcy costs. Agency theory suggests 
that the firm’s capital structure is a result between the agency conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders. The pecking order theory attempts to explain the 
firm’s capital structure as a result of adverse selection between owner-managers 
and outside investors.  
On the empirical side, Frank and Goyal (2007) find evidence consistent 
with the trade-off theory by examining the publicly traded firms in annual 
Compustat data for the period from 1950 to 2003. By using small privately owned 
firms in SSBF 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003, Cole (2008) shows results in support 
of the pecking order theory. One possible explanation for these different findings 
is that small privately owned firms have more severe information asymmetry 
problems than the publicly traded firms because privately owned firms are not 
required to be audited nor disclose information to the public. Furthermore, some 
privately owned firms, such as S-corporations, do not pay corporate taxes and 
have no benefit of tax shields, which is the key element of the trade-off theory. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers find evidence consistent with the 
pecking order theory when they examine privately owned firms and evidence 





We use data from the SSBF 2003 conducted by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (FED). In 1987, 1993, 1998,and 2003, the FED 
collected information on small businesses that have fewer than 500 employees.
7
  
Sample firms in all SSBF data sets were selected from Dun’s Market Identifiers 
(DMI) database, maintained by Dun & Bradstreet Corporation (D&B). However, 
firms’ identities in each SSBF remained confidential, and they were not 
necessarily selected in the other SSBF data sets. Among these surveys, SSBF 1998 
and SSBF 2003 reported information on entrepreneurs’ personal wealth outside of 
their firms. We use SSBF 2003 data for our main analysis and SSBF 1998 data as 
a robustness check.  
In 2003 a total of 9,701,023 firms were initially selected as the survey 
frame after the survey staff excluded governmental, financial, and agricultural 
firms; firms that were branches, divisions, or subsidiaries of a parent business
8
; 
firms with more than 500 employees; and firms that were not in operation as of 
the date of the main interview (2004 or 2005). The survey staff then sampled 
37,600 firms from the sample frame. There were 4,240 firms that completed 
interviews.  
The survey participants reported information on principal ownership 
share; firm’s equity; principal owner’s equity in home residence; principal 
                                                 
7
 In 2008, the FED announced that it would not continue the SSBF.  
8
 The survey staff sets this screen to ensure that only independently operated businesses are 
included in the survey. Firms are ineligible for the survey if a holding company owns 50% or 
more of the firms. However, firms are still eligible if they are subsidiaries of other firms as long as 
other firms do not own 50% or more of the sampled firms. We remove firms that are owned by 
other firms at the later stage.  
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owner’s other net worth (excluding home equity); firm’s two-digit SIC code; 
firm’s total assets; total liabilities; total sales; etc. Firms in SSBF 2003 have fiscal 
year-end dates ranging from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004. Survey interviews 
were conducted between July and December 2004. Those firms whose fiscal year 
ended between January 1 and June 30 were asked to report their balance sheet and 
income statement data as of fiscal year 2004 whereas firms whose fiscal year 
ended between July 1 and December 31 were asked to provided these data as of 
fiscal year 2003. A total of 85 firms (2% of the sample) still reported partial year 
numbers on income statement data (survey question P1: full-year vs. partial year)
9
. 
In such a case, survey staff constructed a fiscal year adjustment factor, which is 
the ratio of 365 to the number of days the income statement covered, to adjust 
variables such as total sales, profit, etc. If firms reported partial year numbers, all 
amounts reported for the items on the income statement were adjusted to full-year 
equivalents by multiplying the income statement items to the adjustment factor.  
We excluded firms whose principal owners were not individuals. If the 
principal owner of a sample firm was another firm, the computed wealth 
allocation variable only described the wealth allocation of the parent company 
rather than the wealth allocation of the decision-maker in the parent company. A 
total of 84 firms (0.024% of the sample) were excluded in this process. In our 
main analysis, we excluded firms with unlimited liability because there is no clear 
distinction between entrepreneurs’ firm wealth and out-of-firm wealth without the 
protection of limited liability. There were 1499 observations that are unlimited 
                                                 
9
 In a robustness check, we excluded these firms that reported partial year numbers. The results 
were consistent with the results when we included them.  
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liability firms (35% of the sample). In a robustness check, we studied a sample 
that included these unlimited liability firms.
10
  
Frank and Goyal (2007) suggest that empirical capital structure research 
should differentiate financially constrained firms from unconstrained ones. We 
focus on firms that are not financially constrained by excluding firms that were 
declined credits and firms which feared being declined and did not apply in the 
past three years. Data item MRL4 in SSBF 2003 reports that a total of 202 (4.7% 
of the sample) firms were declined loans. Data item MRL31 reports that a total of 
621 (14.6% of the sample) firms were discouraged to apply for loans.  
Outliers can generate seriously misleading conclusions if we ignore them. 
The most common method of dealing with the outliers is to remove the extreme 
observations (truncation). For example, Frank and Goyal (2007) truncated key 
variables at the 0.05% level in both tails of the distribution. We truncated the 
extreme observations in the following measures at 1% and 99%:  leverage, firm 
size, profitability, liquidity
11
, and tangible assets.
12
 We obtained a sample of 2,091 
firms after excluding outliers. In a robustness check, we also winsorized these key 
variables at 1% and 99% and studied a sample of 2233 observations.   
 
IV. Methodology 
1. Model  
Our estimation model is: 
                                                 
10
 In section V, we discuss the reason of excluding unlimited liability firms in more details. 
11
 Truncation of extreme values on this measure is at 5%.  
12
 We discuss the definition of these variables in the next section. 
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 * *i i i iLeverage DIV CV           
 (1)  
in which 
iLeverage is the ratio of total loans to total assets or as a robustness 
check, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i. We show later that the 
results are comparable with either dependent variable. iDIV  is the ratio of 
entrepreneur i’s out-of-firm wealth to his total net worth, which measures 
entrepreneur i’s wealth allocation level. iCV  is a vector of control variables which 
includes firm i’s financial statement variables (log of total assets, return on assets, 
liquidity, tangible assets, etc.); number of financial service providers; 
entrepreneurs’ demographic information (experience, gender and founder status); 
and firms’ and entrepreneurs’ personal credit-worthiness. We discuss these 
control variables in more detail in the following paragraphs. i is of course, the 
error term. We assume heteroskedasticity and use robust standard errors in our 
regression.  
 
2. Variables and Predictions 
 We define the variables of regression 1 in Table 1
13
. We define the 
additional control variables we use in the robustness check in Table 2. We show 
the predicted signs of the variables in Table 3. SSBF defines total loans as the sum 
of the outstanding principle of loans, mortgages, notes, bonds, capital leases, and 
any non-recourse loans. Total liabilities are equal to total loans plus current 
liabilities such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, taxes payable, and 
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 All tables are presented in Appendix I.  
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prepayments and deposits or advances from customers, etc.  The ratio of total 
loans to total assets (LR1) is a more popular measure of leverage than the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets (LR2) because loans rather than accounts payable 
and other current liabilities items are considered a capital structure decision. The 
cross-sectional correlation coefficient between these two leverage measures is 
87% for SSBF 2003 and 81% for SSBF 1998. We present results using both 
measures, but the ratio of total loans to total assets is our main focus.  
 Extant capital structure literature has used market value of leverage as the 
main choice of dependent variable and book value of leverage as a robustness 
check. In the case of privately owned firms, market value of leverage is 
unavailable. Moreover, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that managers make the 
financial structure decisions based on book values rather than market values. 
Their survey also shows that CEOs state that they do not rebalance their firms’ 
debt policy in response to the market equity price. This is likely to be even more 
profound for very small privately held firms. 
 We measure an entrepreneur’s wealth allocation by using the ratio of his 
wealth outside of his firm (out-of-firm wealth) to his total net worth. SSBF 2003 
reports the principal owner’s home equity after deducting all mortgages from the 
market value of the house (data item U7_1) and the principal owner’s total net 
worth excluding equity in his home and equity in his firm (data item U8). The 
entrepreneur’s out-of-firm wealth is computed as the sum of these two items 
(U7_1 and U8). The entrepreneur’s firm wealth is equal to the product of his 
share of ownership and the firm’s equity (total assets minus total liabilities). 
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Around 16% of our sample firms are book insolvent, suggesting that they 
may have negative equity values and thus, negative entrepreneurs’ firm wealth. 
Mueller (2008) excluded book insolvent firms from her analysis. However, these 
firms were still in operation during the interview time, which was months after the 
end of their last fiscal year. Furthermore, the leverage levels in these firms could 
be the levels that entrepreneurs prefer according to their risk preferences. Because 
we focus on firms with limited liability, we set the firm equity to zero if the firm 
is book insolvent. We compute the entrepreneur’s total net worth as the sum of his 
firm wealth and his out-of-firm wealth. Therefore, our main variable of interest, 
the entrepreneur’s wealth allocation (DIV), is the ratio of the entrepreneur’s out-
of-firm wealth to his total net worth. This variable measures the percentage of an 
entrepreneur’s wealth allocated outside of his firm. The entrepreneur is more 
tolerate to the financial risk of his firm investment when the DIV is higher. 
We hypothesize that entrepreneurs with more wealth invested in their 
firms use less leverage to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. In contrast, 
entrepreneurs with more wealth outside of the firms use more leverage because 
they can absorb more risk of losing their firm investments. Therefore, we expect 
leverage to be positively related to the entrepreneur’s wealth allocation measure, 
DIV, as indicated in column 7 of Table 3. 
When some entrepreneurs use out-of-firm personal assets as collateral or 
personal guarantees to obtain loans for their firms, that part of their out-of-firm 
assets is subject to the claims of firms’ creditors and is tied to their firms. We 
adjust out-of-firm assets by subtracting the amount of collateralized or guaranteed 
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loans from the out-of-firm assets. DIV2 is the ratio of the adjusted out-of-firm 
assets to entrepreneurs’ total net worth. 
14
 
 We control for capital structure determinants that have been identified in 
the extant literature. Frank and Goyal (2007) review the extant empirical literature 
and suggest that only a small number of determinants are statistically and 
economically significant. These variables include growth options, firm size, 
tangible assets, and profitability. The most common proxy for firm size in the 
literature is the natural logarithm of total assets.
15
 
 The trade-off theory suggests that the firm’s leverage is optimal when the 
marginal benefit of tax shields is equal to the marginal expected deadweight costs 
of bankruptcy. As shown in column 1 of Table 3, it implies a positive relation 
between leverage and firm size because larger firms are more diversified and have 
lower default risk. Firms with lower default risk tend to use more debt. The 
pecking order theory suggests that entrepreneurs prefer to use retained earnings, 
then debt, and then equity because of the adverse selection problem. The relation 
between leverage and firm size can be either negative or positive as shown in 
column 2.  One can argue that the pecking order theory implies a positive relation 
between leverage and firm size because larger firms have fewer information 
asymmetry problems and lower cost of debt. However, firm size can also be used 
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 We discuss the difference between unlimited liability firms and limited liability firms that use 
personal guarantees in section V.  
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 Researchers prefer the log of total assets to the dollar amount of total assets because they can 
explain the coefficient as the change of percentage points in leverage corresponding to the 
percentage change in total assets. Furthermore, the log transformation captures the non-linear 
relation between leverage and firm size because $1 million difference in size is more important to 
the leverage of a small firm than to the leverage of a large one. We measure firm size by using the 




as a proxy for retained earnings because larger firms tend to accumulate more 
retained earnings. In this case, the pecking order theory predicts a negative 
relation between leverage and firms size. Agency theory argues that agency 
conflicts exist between shareholders and debtholders. Larger firms have better 
reputations and fewer information asymmetry problems. As a result, larger firms 
have lower cost of debt. Therefore, it implies that the financial leverage and firm 
size are positively related as shown in column 3.  
Frank and Goyal (2007) find that leverage is positively related to firm size. 
Their finding is in support of the trade-off theory (column 4). However, as shown 
in column 5, Cole (2008) finds that leverage is negatively related to firm size. His 
result is consistent with the pecking-order theory. Mueller (2008) finds no 
significant relation between leverage and firm size (column 6). We use the natural 
log of total assets to measure firm size. If the estimated coefficient is negative, we 
suggest that the result is more consistent with the pecking order theory and firm 
size is a proxy of accumulated retained earnings rather than adverse selection. If 
the estimated coefficient is positive, we cannot reject any of the three theories.  
 The market-to-book ratio, which is the popular proxy for growth options, 
is not available because all of the sample firms are privately owned. Barclay, 
Smith, and Morellec (2006) suggest using Research and Development (R&D) to 
sales, R&D plus advertising to sales, and the earnings-price ratio as alternative 
proxies for growth options. However, none of these variables is available in SSBF 
data. Instead, Cole (2008) uses the increase in the number of employees compared 
with the same firms’ employment of the previous year to proxy for growth 
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opportunities in SSBF firms. Therefore, our measure of growth options is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firms’ numbers of employees increase in 
2003 and 0 otherwise. We also use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firms’ 




 The trade-off theory suggests that leverage should be negatively related to 
growth options because higher growth firms lose more of their value when these 
firms are financially distressed, as indicated in column 1 of Table 3. In contrast, 
column 2 shows that the pecking order theory implies a positive relation between 
leverage and growth options. The intuition is that the high growth firms have 
more investments and accumulate more debt over time, holding profitability 
constant. In column 3, agency theory suggests a negative relation between 
financial leverage and growth options. It is easier for owner-managers in high 
growth firms to replace low- risk projects with high-risk projects. It is also more 
difficult for debtholders in high growth firms to monitor this substitution behavior. 
Therefore, debt financing costs more in high growth firms. 
 The empirical evidence can be found in columns 4, 5 and 6. Frank and 
Goyal (2007) find that leverage is negatively related to growth options, consistent 
with the trade-off theory. They measure growth options by using the market-to-
book ratio. Cole (2008) finds no significant relation between leverage and his 
proxy for growth options. However, he uses the increase in the number of 
employees to proxy for growth options because the market-to-book ratio is not 
available in his data set. Our measure of growth options is a dummy variable that 
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 The increases in employment and sales variables are not available in SSBF 1998.  
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equals 1, if the firm increased its number of employees in the previous year, and 0 
otherwise. We also use an alternative measure, which is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm experienced an increase in sales in the previous year and 0 
otherwise. If the coefficient is positive, we infer that the evidence supports the 
pecking order theory. If the coefficient is negative, it is more consistent with the 
trade-off theory or agency theory. 
 Frank and Goyal (2007) measure profitability by using the ratio of 
operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to total assets. SSBF 
does not report any information on depreciation. Thus we use ROA, the ratio of 
profit after tax (SSBF 2003 data item PROFIT) to total assets, as an alternative 
measure of profitability. 
According to the trade-off theory, profitable firms should use more 
financial leverage because these firms have lower expected bankruptcy costs. 
Thus, column 1 of Table 3 shows that leverage should be positively related to 
profitability. The pecking order theory implies a negative relation between 
leverage and profitability because profitable firms have more retained earnings 
and use less debt financing as indicated in column 2. Agency theory does not 
make a clear inference on the relation between leverage and profitability.  
Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the empirical findings. Frank and Goyal (2007) 
measure profitability by using the ratio of operating income before depreciation to 
total assets. They find a negative relation between leverage and profitability. Cole 
(2008) also shows that leverage is negatively related to profitability. His measure 
of profitability is return on total assets (ROA). Following Cole, we measure 
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profitability by using ROA. If the coefficient is positive, the evidence is more 
consistent with the trade-off theory. However, a negative coefficient is more 
consistent with the pecking order theory.  
 The popular measure for tangible assets in literature is the ratio of net 
property, plant and equipment (Compustat item 8) to total assets. The reason for 
using net property, plant, and equipment is that these assets are tangible and can 
be used as collateral. SSBF 2003 reports book value of land (data item R6) and net 
book value of depreciable assets (data item R7). However, data item R7 is defined 
as the net book value of any buildings and equipment and any other depreciable, 
depletable, or intangible assets. This variable does not differentiate intangible 
assets from tangible assets. If we include it as tangible assets, we could under-
estimate the coefficient and the result would be misleading. Therefore, our 
measure for tangible assets is the sum of inventory and book value of land divided 
by total assets.   
 The trade-off theory suggests that firms with tangible assets tend to lose 
less value when they are financially distressed. Thus it implies a positive relation 
between leverage and tangible assets as shown in column 1 of Table 3. Under the 
pecking order theory, firms with more tangible assets have fewer information 
asymmetry problems and lower cost of debt. In column 2, the implied sign is 
positive. In column 3, agency theory suggests that financial leverage is positively 
related to tangible assets because tangible assets make it difficult for owner-
managers to replace high-risk projects with low-risk ones. 
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Frank and Goyal (2007) use the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment 
to total assets to measure tangible assets. They show that leverage is positively 
related to tangible assets, supporting the trade-off theory. Cole (2008) uses the 
ratio of inventory and property, plant, and equipment
17
 to total assets to measure 
tangible assets. He also finds a positive relation between leverage and tangible 
assets. We expect the sign of the coefficient to be positive as indicated in column 
7.  
 Cole (2008) finds that leverage is related to firm age, liquidity, number of 
firms’ financial service providers (banks and non-bank finance firms), and gender. 
Thus we control for these factors. We define liquidity as the ratio of cash to total 
assets. The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) predicts 
that firms with financial slack use internal financing rather than outside financing 
(debt and equity) to finance their projects. In column 2 of Table 3, we present the 
prediction of the pecking order theory. As shown in column 5, Cole (2008) finds 
leverage is negatively related to liquidity. He uses the ratio of cash to total assets 
to measure liquidity. We expect leverage to be negatively related to liquidity, 
which is consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory. Our measure 
of liquidity is also the ratio of cash to total assets. 
 Cole (2008) finds that leverage increases with the number of firms’ 
financial service providers. He argues that firms tied to more financial service 
providers have more access to debt financing. An alternative explanation is that 
firms have a lower cost of debt when they deal with more financial service 
providers because of the competition among these financial service providers. We 
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 Property, plant, and equipment is not available in SSBF 2003. 
28 
 
expect leverage to be positively related to the number of financial service 
providers because firms associated with more financial service providers tend to 
use more debt financing due to the competition among the financial service 
providers and the lower cost of debt. Our inference is presented in column 7 of 
Table 3. 
Older firms have more financial slack because they have more time to 
generate retained earnings. Under the pecking order theory, one can argue that 
firms with more financial slack prefer to use internal financing. Thus, it suggests a 
negative relation between leverage and firm age as shown in column 2 of Table 3. 
An alternative interpretation is also available. Older firms are better known and 
have less adverse selection. Thus leverage can be positively related to firm age. 
Cole (2008) uses the natural log of firm age in years to measure firm age and 
finds a negative relation between leverage and firm age, which supports the 
pecking order theory. We also use the natural log of firm age in years to measure 
firm age. The intuition of using log transformation is that we expect one-year 
difference in firm age to be more important to younger firms than it to older firms.  
Entrepreneurs’ working experience in their fields can play an important 
role in obtaining credit. More experienced entrepreneurs are likely to know more 
bankers and can obtain loans more easily. We use the natural log of 
entrepreneurs’ experience and expect the sign of the coefficient to be positive. 
The intuition of using log transformation is that we expect one-year difference in 
entrepreneurs’ experience to be more important to less experienced entrepreneurs 
than it to more experienced entrepreneurs. 
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Some studies show that females are less likely to take risk than males. For 
example, Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) find that females allocate significantly less 
of their pension funds to stocks than males. Collerett and Aubry (1990) find that 
women business owners tend to be conservative and avoid using debt financing. 
Therefore, gender could be a proxy for entrepreneurs’ risk preferences. We 
include a dummy variable equal to 1 if entrepreneurs are female to control for the 
possible gender effect on leverage and 0 otherwise. We expect the coefficient of 
Gender to be negative. 
Entrepreneurs who are the original founders of the firms might be 
emotionally tied to their firms and avoid financial risk by limiting leverage usage. 
We include a dummy variable that equals 1 if entrepreneurs are original founders 
and 0 otherwise. We expect the coefficient to be negative. However, it is also 
possible that we fail to find a significant coefficient because founders have the 
option to be highly levered and only commit funds to their firms when needed. 
SSBF 2003 reports information on an entrepreneur’s personal and business 
credit-worthiness. We control for credit-worthiness of entrepreneurs and firms by 
constructing two dummy variables. The first dummy variable is equal to 1 if firms 
declared bankruptcy in the previous seven years and 0 otherwise. The second 
dummy variable is equal to 1 if entrepreneurs declared personal bankruptcy in the 
previous seven years and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that entrepreneurs with 
more credit-worthiness find it easier to obtain credits. Thus, the expected signs of 
these two coefficients are negative.  
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Table 3 presents the theoretical predictions and empirical findings of 
different determinants of capital structure. In columns 1, 2, and 3, we show the 
inferences of the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and agency theory 
respectively. In column 4, we show the empirical findings of Frank and Goyal 
(2007). The empirical results of Cole (2008) are presented in column 5. Mueller 
(2008)’s results are presented in column 6. In column 7, we show the inferences 
of regression 1.   
 
V. Results 
1. Summary Statistics 
We present the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of key variables in Table 4. The average total loans to total assets ratio 
is 44% and the average total liabilities to total assets ratio is 66%. One might 
expect leverage in small private firms to be much higher than leverage in public 
firms because private firms do not have access to public equity markets as public 
ones do. However, we find evidence that leverage levels in publicly traded firms 
of roughly similar size are even higher than those of private firms in our sample.  
We collect all firms that have no more than 500 employees in 2003 fiscal year 
from Compustat. Although not shown in Table 4, the median total liabilities to 
total assets ratio in these small publicly traded firms is 47%. The mean of this 
ratio in small public firms is 87%, much higher than the mean ratio of 66% in 
private firms.
18
 Thus the evidence does not support the notion that private firms 
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 We obtain the mean and median leverage ratios of these small public firms after truncating the 
sample firms at 1% and 99% to adjust for the influence of extreme outliers.  
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should have higher leverage because they cannot raise capital from the public 
equity markets. 
The average DIV is 0.79, suggesting that entrepreneurs on average allocate 
79% of their wealth outside of their firms. After adjusting for out-of-firm wealth 
collateral and personal guarantees, we observe a lower value for the average out-
of-firm wealth allocation measure. The average DIV2 is 0.71, suggesting that 
entrepreneurs on average invest 71% of their wealth outside of their firms. We 
also observe a lower value of the median DIV2 (84%) than the value of the 
median DIV (88%).  
Table 4 shows that the average firm size (log of total assets) is 13.13, 
suggesting that on average firms have total assets of about $0.5 million. The 
smallest firm size value is 6.40 (just $602), while the largest value is 17.32 ($33 
million). The average firm age (log of firm age) is 2.6, suggesting that firms have 
been in their businesses for about 14 years. The youngest firm has just operated 
for 1 year, while the oldest firm has existed for 103 years.  
 The average return on assets (ROA) value is 0.73. However, the median 
ROA is only 0.14. The distribution of ROA is still right-skewed even after we 
remove extreme observations beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles, suggesting that 
the estimation result can be biased because of the existence of a minority group of 
observations with high ROA.  
The mean tangible assets ratio is 20% while the median is 8%. The mean 
liquidity ratio is 0.21, suggesting that firms hold 21% of their total assets in the 
form of cash on average. Table 4 shows that the mean Number of Financial 
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Service Providers (FSP) is 3.14, suggesting that firms have approximately 3 
financial service providers on average. Some firms have as many as 16 financial 
service providers, while other firms have none. In our sample, 64% of the 
entrepreneurs are the original founders of their businesses. Only 16% of the 
entrepreneurs are female, while 84% are male. 
On average, entrepreneurs have around 20 years of experience in their 
own businesses (log of experience is 3.00). The most experienced entrepreneur 
has been working in his field for 71 years (log of experience is 4.26), while the 
least experienced one has only 1 year (log of experience is 0). Table 4 also shows 
that most entrepreneurs are credit-worthy in terms of both firm and personal 
bankruptcy histories. Less than 1% of the entrepreneurs have declared firm or 
personal bankruptcy in the previous 7 years.   
 
2. Multivariate Statistics 
Table 5 Column 1 shows that the coefficient for the allocations measure, 
DIV, is around 0.830 at better than the 1% significance level, suggesting that the 
ratio of total loans to total assets increases by 0.830 percentage points when DIV 
increases by 1 percentage point. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
entrepreneurs who allocate more wealth outside their firms tend to use more 
leverage. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of firm size (log of total assets) is 
negative and significant at better than the 1% level. This result suggests that the 
leverage ratio decreases by 0.065 percentage points as the firm’s total assets 
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increase by 1 percent. This finding is consistent with the inference of the pecking-
order theory that leverage is negatively related to firm size. The coefficient on 
firm size is much smaller than the coefficient of DIV, suggesting that wealth 
allocation plays a more important role in determining financial leverage than firm 
size does in small privately owned firms which have limited liability.  
The positive coefficient of growth options (measured by the increase of 
the number of employees) is consistent with the inference of the pecking-order 
theory. However, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero at the 10% 
significance level. The coefficient of ROA is negative and significant at better 
than the 5% level, which is consistent with the inference of the pecking order 
theory. This result suggests that leverage decreases by 3.6 percentage points as 
ROA increases by 100%.  
Column 1 shows that leverage decreases by 0.281 percentage points as 
liquidity (measured by the ratio of cash to total assets) increases by 1 percentage 
point. The coefficient is significant at better than the 1% level. This result is 
consistent with the prediction of the pecking-order theory that firms with more 
financial slack tend to use less debt financing. The coefficient of tangible assets is 
positive, which is consistent with the predictions of extant capital structure 
theories. However, it is not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
 The coefficient on the number of financial service providers is positive 
and significant at better than the 1% level, suggesting that leverage increases by 
4.4 percentage points as the firm adds one more financial service provider. This 
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result is consistent with our prediction that firms with more financial service 
providers can obtain less costly credits and use more debt financing.  
 The estimate of firm age is also consistent with the prediction of the 
pecking order theory that older firms have more financial slack and use less debt. 
The coefficient is negative and significant at better than the 5% level, suggesting 
that leverage decreases by 4.8 percentage points as the firm age increases by 1%.  
The coefficient of entrepreneurs’ experience is positive. However, it is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level when we use DIV to measure wealth 
allocation. When we adjust the effect of personal guarantees and out-of-firm 
assets collateral by using DIV2, column 2 shows that the coefficient of experience 
is positive and statistically significant at better than the 10% level, suggesting the 
financial leverage ratio increases by 6.6 percentage points when the 
entrepreneur’s experience increases by 1%.  
 Table 5 shows that female entrepreneurs are not necessarily more 
conservative in using debt than male ones. The coefficient is negative, which is 
consistent with our prediction. However, it is not statistically different from zero 
at the 10% significance level.  
We find that entrepreneurs who are the original founders of their 
businesses use less debt than other entrepreneurs, which is consistent with our 
prediction that entrepreneurs who are original founders are more emotionally tied 
with their firms and more conservative in using debt. The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant at better than the 5% level, suggesting that leverage 
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ratio in firms where entrepreneurs are original founders is 8.3 percentage points 
lower than it is in other firms.  
 The coefficient of the entrepreneurs’ personal bankruptcy dummy variable 
is negative and significant at better than 10% level, which is consistent with our 
prediction. This result suggests that firms’ leverage decreases by 36% if 
entrepreneurs have declared personal bankruptcy before. This result shows that 
entrepreneurs who have declared personal bankruptcy in the previous 7 years 
significantly use less debt financing on the firm level. The coefficient of the firm 
bankruptcy dummy variable is not statistically different than zero at better than 
10% level.  
 Column 2 presents the estimation result of regression 1 using DIV2, the 
alternative measure of wealth allocation. We compute DIV2 by deducting the total 
amount of loans that entrepreneurs obtain by using out-of-firm assets as loan 
collateral, personal guarantees, and co-signers from their out-of-firm wealth and 
then dividing the residual by entrepreneurs’ total net worth. Column 2 shows that 
the coefficient of DIV2 is positive and significant at better than the 1% level, 
which is consistent with our prediction that entrepreneurs who have more 
personal wealth allocated outside of their firms tend to use more debt financing. 
Using DIV2, we find that leverage increases by 0.425 percentage points as DIV2 
increases by 1 percentage point. This result shows that the effect of wealth 
allocation on leverage is reduced after we adjust for personal guarantees and out-
of-firm assets as collateral because entrepreneurs actually allocate more wealth to 
their firms than they seemingly do when we use DIV.  
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 Column 2 also shows that leverage is negatively related to firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, and firm age. Furthermore, leverage is positively related to 
the number of financial service providers and entrepreneurs’ experience. These 
results are generally consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory.  
 In column 3 we use the ratio of total liabilities to total assets as the 
alternative measure of leverage. The coefficient of DIV is positive and significant 
at better than the 1% level, which is consistent with our prediction and the result 
in column 1. The estimation results on the control variables are also generally 
consistent with the pecking order theory. 
 In column 4 we present the result of regression 1 using the increase in 
sales dummy variable (Growth Options Sales) as an alternative proxy for growth 
options. The estimation results on DIV and most control variables are consistent 
with our predictions and those presented in column 1. However, the coefficient of 
Growth Options Sales itself is not statistically different from zero at better than 
10% level. Column 5 shows the result of regression 1 on the SSBF 1998 data. The 
coefficient of DIV is positive and significant at better than the 1% level. This 
result is consistent with our prediction.  
 
3. Firm Report Partial Year Data 
 There are 85 firms in SSBF 2003 that report partial year numbers on the 
financial statement. By including them, our estimation result could be biased 
because these firms’ operations can be seasonal. In column 6, we test regression 1 
using the data set that excludes these firms. Some firms that report partial year 
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numbers are unlimited liability firms or overlap with the truncated outliers. Thus 
we obtain a sample of 2055 observations after we exclude the firms that report 
partial year numbers. Column 6 shows that the coefficient of DIV is positive and 
statistically significant at better than 1% level, which is consistent with our 
prediction and the result presented in column 1. Thus, these 85 firms that report 
partial year data do not bias our results. The coefficients of other independent 
variables are generally consistent with the result in column 1. The only exception 
is that the coefficient of tangible assets is positive and significant at the 10%, 
suggesting that leverage increases by 0.13 percentage points as the ratio of cash to 
total assets increases by 1 percentage point.  
 
4.  Winsorization 
Another common method of dealing with the influence of outliers is to use 
winsorization, in which the most extreme tails of the distribution are replaced by 
the specific percentiles of the data. We winsorize LR1, LR2, Profitability, Firm 
Size, ROA, and Liquidity at 1 and 99 percentiles and present the estimation result 
of regression 1 in column 7 and column 8. Column 7 shows that the coefficient of 
DIV is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level, which is 
consistent with our prediction and the result presented in column 1. Column 8 
shows that the coefficient of DIV2 is also positive and statistically significant at 
better than the 1% level. The magnitudes of these two coefficients are comparable 
to those when we use truncated data. The coefficients of other independent 
variables are generally consistent with those presented in column 1 except the 
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coefficients on profitability and experience. The coefficient on profitability is 
negative, which is consistent with the earlier estimation. However, it is not 
statistically different from zero. The coefficient on experience is positive and 
significant at the 10% level or better, which is consistent with our prediction that 
more experienced entrepreneurs find it easier to obtain credits. This result 
suggests that leverage increases by 8.5 percentage points (11 percentage points in 
column 8) when experience increases by 1 percent.   
 
5.  50% Or More Ownership 
 Although entrepreneurs in our sample are the largest shareholders of their 
firms, some of them do not own more than 50% of the total shares. In this case, it 
is possible that their wealth allocation do not affect the firm-level capital structure 
decisions because of the lack of dominant shareholdings. We test regression 1 on 
a group of entrepreneurs who own more than 50% of the shares. There are 1284 
observations in this data set. Column 1 presents the estimation result of regression 
1 using this subset of firms with dominant shareholders. The coefficient of DIV is 
positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level, which is consistent 
with our prediction and the earlier estimation results. The coefficients of other 
independent variables are generally consistent with those presented in column 1 
except those on tangible assets and owner bankruptcy dummy. The coefficient on 
tangible assets is positive and statistically significant at better than the 5% level, 
suggesting that leverage increases by 0.2 percentage points as tangible assets 
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increases by 1 percentage point. The coefficient on owner bankruptcy dummy is 
negative but statistically insignificant at the 10% level.  
 
6. Additional Control Variables 
Table 6 presents the results when we include additional control variables. 
These control variables include: (a) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
has been delinquent on its business obligations for 60 or more days in the 
previous 3 years and 0 otherwise; (b) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if any 
court judgment has been rendered against the firm in the previous 3 years and 0 
otherwise; (c) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the owners have been 
delinquent on their personal obligations for 60 or more days in the previous 3 
years and 0 otherwise; (d) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if any court judgment 
has been rendered against the owner in the previous 3 years and 0 otherwise; (e) 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if entrepreneurs are Caucasians and 0 
otherwise; (f) entrepreneurs’ ages in years; (g) dummy variable that is equal to 1 
if firms pay corporate tax (C-corporation) and 0 otherwise; (h) the credit score 
from Dun and Bradstreet (D&B). D&B categorizes the firms’ creditworthiness 
into 6 grades (1 for the riskiest and 6 for the least risky); and (i) a series of 
dummy variables that equal 1 if firms have the industry-specific two-digit SIC 
codes and 0 otherwise. Table 2 defines these additional control variables. 
The coefficients of DIV and DIV2 in Table 6 are both positive and 
significant at better than the 1% level, which are consistent with our prediction. 
The coefficients of other independent variables are generally comparable to those 
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presented in column 1 except the one on owner bankruptcy dummy. The 
coefficient on owner bankruptcy dummy is negative but statistically insignificant 
at the 10% level. The coefficients of the additional control variables are mostly 
insignificant at the 10% level. The additional control variables that contribute to 
the variation of leverage ratio are the dummy variables of service (SIC 70-89), 
retail (SIC52-59) and wholesale (SIC 50-51) industries, suggesting that firms in 
these industries tend to have a lower leverage ratio than manufacturing firms. 
These results are consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory that 
firms with fewer fixed assets tend to more information asymmetry and higher cost 
of debt.   
 
7.  Multicollinearity 
 If any of the right-hand-side variables is highly correlated with other 
independent variables, then regression 1 will yield unbiased but inefficient 
estimates because of the large variances for the estimators. We examine the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerances (1/VIF) values of regression 1
19
. 
VIF represents the inflation in the variance of the parameter due to collinearity. 
Table 7 shows that the VIF values ranges from 2.46 to 1.01, significantly lower 
than the critical value of 5. Therefore, it is fair to claim that standard errors are not 
overestimated in regression 1 and mutlicollinearity is not affecting the estimation 
of regression 1. 
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8.  Endogeneity 
In Table 8 we show the results of a Hausman test by using entrepreneurs’ 
education as an instrumental variable (dummy variable, College, is equal to 1 if 
entrepreneurs have college degrees or above and 0 otherwise). Mueller (2008) 
uses entrepreneurs’ age and gender as instrumental variables for their wealth 
allocations. We also use age and gender as alternative instrumental variables. 
However, using Mueller’s data, we show that age appears to be directly correlated 
with firms’ leverage, suggesting that it might not be a good instrumental variable 
for DIV.  
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) show that the less-educated investors hold 
less-diversified portfolios. Thus, we argue that education is correlated with 
leverage only through wealth allocations and use College (1 if education level is 
college degree or above and 0 otherwise) as the instrumental variable for the 
endogenous variable, DIV.  The underlying reason is that it is likely that college 
educated entrepreneurs have higher incomes, accumulate more out-of-firm wealth 
before they become self-employed, and keep their portfolios more diversified than 
others.  
 In Table 8, columns 1 and 4 show that the coefficients for College are not 
significant, suggesting that College is not related to leverage other than through 
DIV. Columns 2 and 5 present the regression result of DIV and DIV2 on College 
and other control variables. The coefficients of College in both columns are 
positive and significant at better than 5% levels, which are consistent with the 
result of Goetzmann and Kumar (2008). We then obtain the fitted value from the 
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column 2 and column 5 regressions and regress the ratio of total loans to total 
assets on the fitted values, DIV (DIV2), and other control variables. The 
coefficients of the fitted values are not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that endogeneity does not bias the regression result significantly. OLS 
(or WLS) is a more efficient approach than the Two-Stage-Least-Square 
approach.  
 
9.  Unlimited Liability Firms and Limited Liability Firms Using 
Personal Guarantees 
 We argue that the wealth allocation of entrepreneurs in unlimited liability 
firms do not matter in determining their firm-level capital structure decisions 
because, without the limited liability protection, all creditors of the firms can 
claim entrepreneurs’ out-of-firm assets. This is different than limited liability 
firms that use personal guarantees to obtain loans. Personal guarantee is creditor-
specific because only the creditor who has the personal guarantee from the 
entrepreneur can secure the loan repayment by claiming the entrepreneur’s out-of-
firm assets in case of firm bankruptcy. For example, an entrepreneur in a limited 
liability firm obtains $1,000 loans from two creditors. $500 is obtained from 
creditor A by using a personal guarantee. $500 is borrowed from creditor B 
without any personal guarantee. In this case, the entrepreneur shifts only $500 of 
his out-of-firm wealth to firm-related wealth. In our dataset, on average, only 39% 
of the total amounts of loans that a firm has are borrowed by using personal 
guarantees (median is 0%). To avoid a significant reduction in our sample size, it 
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is more desirable to retain limited liability firms that use personal guarantees if we 
can adjust the wealth shift effect caused by personal guarantees. We adjust the 
effect of personal guarantees by computing DIV2, which accounts for the wealth 
shift from out-of-firm wealth to firm wealth. In contrast, it is more desirable to 
discard unlimited liability firms if entrepreneurs’ wealth allocation does not affect 
financial leverage in these firms. In the remaining part of this section, we show 
that that regression 1 does not apply to unlimited liability firms. 
 We use the generalized dummy variable technique developed by Gujarati 
(1970 a, b) to examine whether DIV has a different effect on leverage in firms 
with limited liability than in firms with unlimited liability. We introduce two 
additional variables on the right-hand side of regression 1: a dummy variable that 
is equal to1 if firms are limited liability firms and 0 otherwise; and an interaction 
term that is the product of DIV and the dummy variable. The modified model is 
shown below:  
 
1 2 3* * * *i i i i i iLeverage DIV LL Interaction CV            
 (2) 
where iLL  is the dummy variable and iInteraction  is the interaction term 
of iDIV  and iLL . Other variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. The null 
hypothesis of this model is that 2 and 3  are not statistically different from zero, 
which means the coefficients of iDIV and the intercepts are the same across 
limited and unlimited liability firms. When iLL  is equal to 0, the intercept term is 
 and the coefficient of iDIV is 1 . When iLL  is equal to 1, the intercept term is 
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 + 2 and the coefficient of iDIV is 1 + 3 . If 1  is not statistically significant, 
it means that iLeverage  is not related to iDIV  when iLL  is equal to 0 (unlimited 
liability firms). This null hypothesis is consistent with the economic intuition that 
wealth allocation only affects entrepreneurs’ willingness to use financial leverage 
in limited liability firms; entrepreneurs’ wealth are 100% tied to their firms in 
unlimited liability firms and thus do not affect the financial leverage on the firm 
level.  
We test regression 2 on the dataset that includes both limited and 
unlimited liability firms.  In Table 9, column 1 presents the estimation result of 
regression 2 on the dataset that includes both limited and unlimited liability firms. 
The coefficient of DIV is not statistically different from zero, which suggests that 
wealth allocation does not affect financial leverage in unlimited liability firms 
( iLL =0) as expected by economic intuition. However, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level, 
which indicates that financial leverage is positively related to wealth allocation 
for limited liability firms ( iLL =1). This result is consistent with our earlier result 
presented in Table 5. We also run regression 1 on a dataset that contains unlimited 
liability firms as a robustness check. Column 2 shows that the coefficient of DIV 
is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that wealth allocation does not 
matter in determining financial leverage of unlimited liability firms.  
 We show that different model specifications should apply to limited 
liability firms and unlimited liability firms. Because we are interested in the effect 
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of wealth allocation on leverage in this paper, we focus on firms with limited 
liability.  
 
VI. Policy Implication 
Our research focuses on small privately owned firms that have limited 
liability, which is a significant portion of all small privately owned firms. In our 
nationally representative sample, limited liability firms account for more than 
50% of all small privately owned firms. We do not intend to generalize our results 
to the population of small businesses. However, our results have important policy 
implications for incorporated small privately owned firms, which account for a 
significant portion of the overall economy. On the micro-level, we show that 
entrepreneurs in these firms adjust their firm-level capital structure according to 
their wealth allocation. It is important for lenders to understand this relation so 
that they can design products to meet entrepreneurs’ financing needs and control 
lending risk.  
On the macro-level, our findings are also meaningful in the following 
aspects. First, the Small Business Administration (SBA) currently helps small 
businesses in obtaining financing by offering loan guarantees. However, SBA 
requires that these SBA-backed loans must also be personally guaranteed by any 
person that owns 20% or more interest in the firm. If SBA-backed loans do not 
offer better interest rates than loans obtained directly from banks using personal 
guarantees, then personal guarantees merely shift wealth allocation from out-of-
firm wealth to firm wealth, which discourages entrepreneurs’ incentives to apply 
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for loans. Thus we argue that the personal guarantee requirements of the SBA-
backed loans are not necessarily helpful to entrepreneurs in privately held limited 
liability firms unless borrowers can obtain better interest rates by using SBA. 
Second, we show evidence that is consistent with the inference of the pecking-
order theory in these firms where information asymmetry is more prevalent than 
in public corporations. It is important for policy-makers to understand that 
information asymmetry is an important factor that makes it more expensive and 
difficult for these firms to finance their projects. Our findings are consistent with 
the inference of the pecking order theory that smaller and younger firms are 
adversely affected by the higher information asymmetry, which result in lower 
financial leverage. However, outside debt financing is extremely important for 
these very small and young privately-owned firms. One important policy 
implication is that lenders and policy makers could develop mechanisms to reduce 
the information asymmetry problem among small privately owned firms. For 
example, a universal small business database which keeps track of businesses’ 
operational and financial information and business owners’ demographic 
information might help in reducing the information asymmetry problem.  
In our analysis, we also show that firms’ leverage increases with the 
number of their financial service providers. This finding is important especially at 
the current time when policy makers seek to revive the economy from a deep 
recession. According to Girard (2009), since the financial crisis began in 2008, 
the U.S. government has spent enormous amounts of money on bailing out 
businesses that are “too big to fail”. However, as a critical part of the overall 
47 
 
economy, small businesses are also facing credit constraints in the crisis. They 
require the same attention as big businesses do. Our result suggests that small 
privately owned firms benefit from more competition among lenders, which could 
be meaningful for policy-makers when they design policies to revive the economy 
from the recession.          
   
VII. Conclusion 
 In this paper we examine the relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
allocations of wealth and their firms’ leverage levels. We find that entrepreneurs’ 
wealth allocation, measured by the ratio of their out-of-firm wealth to their total 
wealth, is positively related to their firm-level financial leverage. Compared to the 
previous literature, we use a sample that is more representative of the population 
by including book insolvent firms. Moreover, we show that the positive relation 
between leverage and wealth allocation still exists after we adjust for the out-of-
firm wealth collateral, personal guarantees, and cosigners. Our paper contributes 
to the literature by focusing on the effect of DIV on capital structure. We conclude 
that an entrepreneur’s wealth allocation, which had been previously overlooked in 
the traditional capital-structure literature, plays an important role in determining 
firm-level capital structure.  
  It will be interesting if our analysis can be extended to publicly traded 
firms when data on CEOs’ personal wealth becomes available. CEOs in publicly 
traded firms also have a significant portion of their personal wealth tied to their 
firms in the forms of stocks, stock options and restricted stocks. One can argue 
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that CEOs’ wealth allocation could affect their firm-level decision-makings in 
these publicly traded firms. May (1995) estimates the personal wealth of CEOs in 
public traded corporations by using their accumulated salaries and finds CEOs’ 
wealth allocation affects their firm-level decisions, such as acquisition decisions. 
Future research on the relation between CEOs wealth allocations and firm-level 
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LR1 Total loans divided by total assets 
LR2 Total liabilities divided by total assets 
DIV The entrepreneur’s out-of-firm wealth divided by his total net worth 
DIV2 The entrepreneur’s out-of-firm wealth adjusted for collateral divided by his total net worth 
Size Log of total assets 
Growth Options (Employment) Dummy variable for firms with positive employment growth during 2003 fiscal year 
Growth Options (Sales) Dummy variable for firms with positive sales growth during 2003 fiscal year 
Profitability Net income divided by total assets 
Tangible Assets  Sum of inventory and book value of land divided by total assets 
Liquidity  Cash divided by total assets 
Firm Age Log of firm age 
Number of FSP The number of the firm’s financial service providers 
Gender 1 if the entrepreneur is female, 0 otherwise 
Founder 1 if the entrepreneur is the original founder, 0 otherwise 
Owner Bankruptcy 1 if the entrepreneur declared personal bankruptcy in the previous 7 years, 0 otherwise 
Firm Bankruptcy 1 if the firm declared bankruptcy in the previous 7 years, 0 otherwise 
Experience Log of the entrepreneur’s experience in his current business (in years) 
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Additional Variable Definition 
Firm Delinquency 1 if the firm has been delinquent on its business obligations for 60 or more days in the previous 3 years, 0 otherwise 
Firm Judgment 1 if any judgment has been rendered against the firm in previous 3 years, 0 otherwise 
Owner Delinquency 1 if the entrepreneur has been delinquent on his business obligations for 60 or more days in the previous 3 years, 0 otherwise
Firm Judgment 1 if any judgment has been rendered against the entrepreneur in previous 3 years, 0 otherwise 
Credit Ratings Dun and Bradstreet Rank Credit Score – 1 most risky, 6 least risky 
Outside Manager 1 if the entrepreneur hires an outside manager, 0 otherwise 
Age The entrepreneur’s age in years 
Race  1 if the entrepreneur is white, 0 otherwise 
Corporate Tax 1 if the firm pays corporate tax, 0 otherwise 
Mining 1 if the firm is in SIC 10-14: Mining, 0 otherwise  
Construction 1 if the firm is in SIC 15-19: Construction, 0 otherwise 
Manufacturing 1 if the firm is in SIC 20-39: Manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
Utility  1 if the firm is in SIC 40-49: Transportation/Public Utilities, 0 otherwise 
Wholesale 1 if the firm is in SIC 50-51: Wholesale Trade, 0 otherwise 
Retail 1 if the firm is in SIC 52-59: Retail Trade, 0 otherwise 
Service 1 if the firm is in SIC 70-89: Services, 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 3. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE COEFFICIENTS 
 
 
 Theory Predictions Empirical Findings 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Variables Trade-Off  Pecking-Order  Agency  
Frank & 
Goyal 
(2007) Cole (2008) 
Mueller 
(2008) Li (2009) 
DIV ? ? ? ? ? - + 
Firm Size  + +/- + + - 0 +/- 
Growth Options - +/- - - 0 ? +/- 
Profitability + - ? - - ? +/- 
Tangible Assets + +/- + + + ? +/- 
Liquidity ? - ? ? - ? - 
Firm Age ? +/- ? ? - - - 
FSP ? ? ? ? + ? + 
Gender ? ? ? ? - ? - 
Founder ? ? ? ? ? ? - 
Experience ? ? ? ? ? ? + 
Owner Bankruptcy ? ? ? ? - ? - 
Firm Bankruptcy  ? ? ? ? - ? - 
  
0 stands for the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. ? stands for the theory having no prediction on the coefficient or 
the variable is missing or not reported in the empirical study. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 58 
TABLE 4. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of our key variables based on the SSBF 2003 data. Our sample has 2091 observations. Variables are defined in 
Table 1. 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
LR1 0.44 0.20  0.81 0.00 9.49 
LR2 0.66 0.47 1.00 0.00 10.54 
DIV 0.79  0.88 0.23 0.00 1.00 
DIV2 0.71  0.84 0.34 0.00  1.00 
SIZE 13.14 13.25  2.12 6.40 17.32 
Growth Options  0.25 0.00   0.43  0.00 1.00 
Profitability 0.73 0.14  2.26 -4.40 24.55 
Tangible Assets 0.19 0.08  0.24 0.00 1.00 
Liquidity 0.21 0.11  0.25 0.00 1.00 
Firm Age 2.58 2.77 0.88 0.00 4.63 
Number of FSP 3.14 3.00  1.90 0.00 16.00 
Gender 0.16 0  0.37 0.00 1.00 
Founder 0.64 1  0.48 0.00 1.00 
Experience 3.01 3.18  0.65 0.00 4.26 
Firm Bankruptcy 0.00 0  0.06 0.00 1.00 
Owner Bankruptcy 0.00 0  0.06 0.00 1.00 
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TABLE 5. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
Column 1 presents the regression 1 result on the sample excluding credit-constrained firms and outliers in SSBF 2003 by LR1 as the dependent 
variable and DIV as the variable of interest. In column 2, we use DIV2 as the alternative variable of interest. In column 3, we use LR2 as the 
alternative dependant variable.  Column 4 presents the result of regression 1 on a sub-sample of firms that do not use out-of-firm wealth 
collateral, personal guarantees, and co-signers. Column 5 shows the result of regression 1 when we use the increase in sales as the alternative 
proxy for growth options. Column 6 shows the result of regression 1 using SSBF 1998 data. Variables are defined in Table 1. Regression 1 is: 
LOANS/ASSETSi=B0+B1*DIVi+B2*SIZEi+B3*GROWTH OPTIONSi+ B4*ROAi+B5*TANGIBLE ASSETSi+B6*LIQUIDITY i+B7*NUMBER 
OF FSPi+B8*FIRM AGEi+B9*EXPERIENCEi+B10*GENDERi+B11*FOUNDERi+ B12*OWNER BANKRUPTCYi+ B13*FIRM 




* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 1998 
SSBF 2003 





SSBF 2003  
50%+ Shares 
  LR1 LR1 LR2 LR1 LR1 LR1 LR1 LR1 LR1 
DIV 0.830   1.117 0.833 0.783 0.834 0.743  0.862 
  (13.84)***   (15.61)*** (13.72)*** (8.76)*** (13.85)*** (11.62)***  (10.48)*** 
DIV2   0.425           0.438   
    (12.44)***           (12.49)***   
SIZE -0.065 -0.092 -0.082 -0.062 -0.041 -0.063 -0.098 -0.118 -0.079 
  (3.60)*** (5.56)*** (3.65)*** (3.54)*** (1.80)* (3.50)*** (5.24)*** (6.85)*** (3.27)*** 
Growth Options 0.032 0.034 0.114     0.020  0.034  0.036  0.047  
(Employment) (0.79) (0.82) (2.01)**     (0.50)  (0.80)  (0.86)  (0.90)  
Growth Options       -0.023           
(Sales)       (0.68)           
Profitability -0.036 -0.036 -0.043 -0.036 0.082 -0.040 -0.004 -0.004 -0.043 
  (2.39)** (2.45)** (2.59)** (2.36)** (1.59) (2.64)*** (0.23) (0.30) (1.85)* 
Tangible Assets 0.114 0.085 0.141 0.109 0.326 0.131 0.108 0.082 0.200 
  (1.53) (1.13) (1.37) (1.47) (2.62)*** (1.73)* (1.28) (0.97) (1.82)** 
Liquidity  -0.281 -0.313 -0.385 -0.281 -0.311 -0.274 -0.221 -0.253 -0.293 
  (2.80)*** (3.11)*** (3.19)*** (2.80)*** (1.18) (2.68)*** (1.92)* (2.20)** (2.42)** 
Number of FSP. 0.044 0.054 0.062 0.046 0.084 0.042 0.055 0.063 0.034 
 (5.31)*** (6.48)*** (5.80)*** (5.39)*** (1.96)** (5.32)*** (5.74)*** (6.59)*** (3.36)*** 
Firm Age -0.048 -0.063 -0.062 -0.051 -0.053 -0.062 -0.076 -0.087 -0.018 
  (2.05)** (2.64)*** (1.98)** (2.16)** (1.38) (2.42)** (2.34)** (2.69)*** (0.54) 
Experience 0.031 0.066 0.050 0.027 0.004 0.033 0.085 0.110 0.043 
  (0.80) (1.73)* (0.94) (0.70) (1.31) (0.84) (1.90)* (2.49)** (0.86) 
Gender -0.025 -0.037 -0.041 -0.024 -0.012 -0.026 -0.070 -0.077 0.017 
  (0.47) (0.69) (0.64) (0.46) (0.14) (0.49) (1.24) (1.36) (0.24) 
Founder -0.083 -0.078 -0.093 -0.076 -0.103 -0.080 -0.109 -0.104 -0.181 
  (2.22)** (2.09)** (2.12)** (2.09)** (1.43) (2.14)** (2.64)*** (2.52)** (3.20)*** 
Owner bankrupt -0.357 -0.373 -0.614 -0.361 -0.913 -0.366 -0.502 -0.505 -0.277 
  (1.70)* (1.70)* (2.73)*** (1.73)* (0.88) (1.73)* (2.23)** (2.21)** (1.03) 
Firm Bankrupt 0.237 0.244 0.328 0.228 dropped 0.246 0.056 0.067 0.395 
  (0.76) (0.77) (0.99) (0.73) dropped (0.78) (0.19) (0.22) (0.85) 
Constant 0.643 1.279 0.833 0.637 0.315 0.657 1.060 1.538 0.787 
  (2.58)*** (5.75)*** (2.63)*** (2.57)*** (0.93) (2.58)*** (4.07)*** (6.76)*** (2.41)** 
Observations 2091 2091 2091 2091 1319 2055 2233 2233 1284 
R-squared 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.109 0.106 0.12 
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TABLE 6. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS WITH ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Table 6 presents the results when we include additional control variables. In column 1, we use DIV as the main 
variable of interest. In column 2, we use DIV2 as the alternative variable of interest. Variables are defined in Table 1 
and Table 2. Robust t-statistics have been omitted for space reasons.  
 
  1 2 
  LR1 LR1 
DIV 0.848***   
DIV2   0.427** 
SIZE -0.070*** -0.100*** 
Growth Options 0.033 0.035 
Profitability -0.037** -0.039** 
Tangible Assets 0.148 0.102 
Liquidity -0.258** -0.294*** 
Number of FSP 0.044*** 0.055*** 
Firm Age -0.051* -0.066** 
Experience 0.030 0.060 
Gender -0.025 -0.042 
Founder -0.080** -0.073* 
Owner bankrupt -0.342 -0.354 
Firm bankrupt 0.203 0.213 
Age 0.025 0.050 
Outside Manager 0.020 -0.004 
Race 0.040 0.035 
Credit Ratings 0.001 -0.001 
Firm Delinquency 0.062 0.071 
Firm Judgment  0.013 0.018 
Owner Delinquency 0.043 -0.028 
Owner Judgment -0.014 -0.040 
Corporate Tax 0.017 0.007 
Service -0.151*** -0.147** 
Retail -0.112** -0.098* 
Wholesale -0.155*** -0.141** 
Utility -0.096 -0.084 
Construction -0.064 -0.138 
Mining 0.073 0.152 
Constant 0.658 1.079 
Observations 2091 2091 
R-squared 0.117 0.107 
 
 Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 7. VIF TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY 
 
Table 7 presents the Variance Inflation Factor test of Regression 1. The highest and average VIF values are 2.46 and 
1.01 respectively. The average VIF value is 1.32, which is significantly lower than the common critical value of 5, 
suggesting that multicollinearity does not affect the estimation results significantly. 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
DIV 1.48 0.674 
SIZE 2.46 0.406 
Growth Options 1.09 0.917 
Tangible Assets 1.14 0.876 
Profitability 1.09 0.917 
Liquidity 1.32 0.755 
Number of FSP 1.27 0.786 
Firm Age 1.53 0.652 
Experience 1.59 0.628 
Gender 1.08 0.929 
Founder 1.11 0.900 
Owner Bankrupt 1.01 0.987 
Firm Bankrupt 1.01 0.989 
Mean VIF 1.32  
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TABLE 8. HAUSMAN TESTS ON ENDOGENEITY 
 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of College is not significant, suggesting that College is not related to the dependent variable other than 
through DIV. Column 2 presents the regression result of DIV (the ratio of out-of-firm wealth to total net worth) on College and other control 
variables. In Column 3, we obtain the fitted value from Column 2 regression and regress the ratio of total loans to total assets on the fitted value, 
DIV, and other control variables. The coefficient of the fitted value is insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that endogeneity does not 
significantly affect the estimation result. WLS is a more efficient approach. Column 4, 5, and 6 are the repetitions of Column 1, 2, and 3 using 
DIV2 as the alternative variable of interest. Other control variables in the regression are not presented here for simplicity.  
 
  
 Hausman Test Using DIV 
  
  
 Hausman Test Using DIV2 
  
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  LR1 DIV LR1 LR1 DIV2 LR1 
DIV 0.838   0.838       
  (13.88)***   (13.88)***       
DIV2       0.427   0.427 
        (12.42)***   (12.42)*** 
College -0.039 0.033   -0.026 0.033   
  (1.10) (3.70)***   (0.72) (2.31)**   
Fitted values     -1.195     -0.779 
      (1.10)     (0.72) 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust t statistics in parentheses 
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TABLE 9. REGRESSION 2 (TEST ON UNLIMITED LIABILITY FIRMS) 
 
Column 1 shows the estimation result of regression 2 by using the dataset of both limited and unlimited liability firms. The coefficient of 
Interaction is positive and significant, suggesting that wealth allocation only affects financial leverage in limited liability firms (ll=1). The 
coefficient of DIV is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that wealth allocation does not affect financial leverage in unlimited liability 
firms. Column 2 shows the estimation result of regression 1 by using a subset of data that only contains unlimited liability firms. The coefficient 
of DIV is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that wealth allocation does not affect financial leverage in unlimited liability firms. This 




























































  1 2 
  Pooled Unlimited 
  LR1 LR1 
DIV 0.150 0.168  
  (0.67) (0.63)  
LL -0.415   
  (2.53)**   
Interaction  0 .700  
 (3.33)***  
SIZE -0.049 -0.034 
  (3.27)*** (1.23) 
Growth Options 0.008 -0.067 
(Employment) (0.22) (0.84) 
Profitability -0.016 0.001 
  (1.65)* (0.07) 
Tangible Assets -0.013 -0.152 
  (0.25) (2.04)** 
Liquidity  -0.220 -0.155 
  (2.84)*** (1.29) 
Number of FSP. 0.058 0.116 
 (7.03)*** (5.07)*** 
Firm Age -0.065 -0.086 
  (2.74)*** (1.50) 
Experience -0.006 -0.062 
  (0.18) (0.98) 
Gender -0.089 -0.146 
  (2.33)** (2.71)*** 
Founder -0.089 -0.102 
  (2.64)*** (1.42) 
Owner bankrupt -0.215 -0.187 
  (1.89)** (1.85)* 
Firm Bankrupt 0.352 0.492 
  (1.46) (1.41) 
Constant 0.964 0.906 
  (3.19)*** (1.88)* 
Observations 3206 1115 
R-squared 0.08 0.06 
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Replication of Mueller’s (2008) Results 
 
  In Table 10 Column 1, we replicate Mueller’s results. Mueller has 2617 observations in 
her sample. We apply the same selection criteria on SSBF 98, such as the exclusion of book 
insolvent firms. However, we only obtain a sample of 2434 observations. In Column 2, we show 
that there could be better instruments for wealth allocation other than age and gender. Prior 
literature has found that women business owners tend to be conservative and avoid using debt 
financing (Collerett and Aubry, 1990). Age could also be correlated with leverage through 
channels other than wealth allocations. Older people tend to be more financially conservative and 
use less leverage than younger ones. Older entrepreneurs are often more reputable than their 
younger counterparts because they tend to have been in business longer. Thus, older 
entrepreneurs might find it easier to obtain loans. For the above reasons, we argue that gender 
and age might not be the best instruments. Column 1 shows the replication results of Mueller 
(2008). We obtain results similar to Mueller’s. However, in column 2 we show that there could 
be better instruments for wealth allocation (lack of allocations to be exact) than gender and age 
because the coefficients of these two variables are significantly related to leverage directly. 
Therefore, OLS (or WLS) is a more efficient approach for estimating Regression 1.  
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TABLE 10. REPLICATION OF MUELLER’S RESULTS (2008) 
In Table 10, Column 1 shows the replication of Mueller (2008). Column 2 shows that gender and age are directly 
related to leverage. Therefore, WLS is more efficient than 2-stage-least-squares. lev2 stands for the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets; SNWI stands for the ratio of entrepreneurs’ firm wealth to total net worth; TOTEMP stands 
for the natural log of the number of employees; C_FAGE stands for the natural log of firms’ ages in years; sic1-7 are 
dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the firm’s SIC code is 1-7 and 0 otherwise; prop is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm is a proprietorship and 0 otherwise; part is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is a 
partnership and 0 otherwise; scorp is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is a S-corporation and 0 
otherwise; ccorp is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is a C-corporation and 0 otherwise; hispanic is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the owner is Hispanic and 0 otherwise; asian is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the owner is Asian and 0 otherwise; black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the owner is Black and 0 
otherwise; region 1-8 are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the firm is located in the region (New England, Mid 
Atlantic, East N Central, West N Central, South Atlantic, East S Central, West S Central, Mountain, and Pacific) and 
0 otherwise; MSA is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is located in a metro area and 0 otherwise; 
highschool is a dummy variable if the owner has a high school degree or above and 0 otherwise; C_EXP is the 
owner’s working experience in years; DB_SCORE is D&B credit score rank ranging from the least risky score (1) to 
the most risky score (5); U1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy 
in the past 7 years and 0 otherwise; ownerdel is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the principal owner has been 
delinquent on her personal obligations in the past 60 or more days and 0 otherwise; firmdel is a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 if the firm has been delinquent on its’ obligations in the past 60 or more days and 0 otherwise; U4 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if judgments have been rendered against the principal owner and 0 otherwise; 
length is the number of years that firms have been dealing with its’ current financial service providers; female is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the principal owner is female and 0 otherwise; C_OAGE is the principal owner’s 
age in years.   
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Table 10 






SNWI 1.002 -0.204 
 (4.10)*** (7.97)*** 
female  -0.064 
  (4.45)*** 
C_OAGE  -0.003 
  (4.79)*** 
TOTEMP 0 0.001 
 -0.98 (8.55)*** 
C_FAGE -0.002 -0.002 
 (2.72)*** (3.79)*** 
sic1 -0.02 0.07 
 -0.52 (3.13)*** 
sic2 -0.02 0.093 
 -0.48 (3.44)*** 
sic3 -0.064 0.078 
 -1.37 (3.06)*** 
sic4 0.004 0.106 
 -0.07 (3.18)*** 
sic5 -0.026 0.08 
 -0.82 (4.67)*** 
sic6 0.041 0.082 
 -1.1 (2.83)*** 
sic7 -0.027 0.02 
 -1.09 -1.17 
prop -0.172 -0.184 
 (4.44)*** (6.62)*** 
part -0.022 -0.063 
 -0.44 (1.75)* 
scorp -0.002 0.006 
 -0.06 -0.21 
ccorp -0.008 0.013 
 -0.22 -0.46 
hispanic -0.009 -0.017 
 -0.28 -0.72 
asian -0.014 -0.011 
 -0.41 -0.43 
black -0.046 -0.02 
 -1.37 -0.81 
region1 -0.033 -0.009 
 -0.72 -0.3 
region2 -0.036 -0.008 
 -1.22 -0.37 
region3 0.033 0.034 
 -1.16 -1.64 
region4 -0.047 0.005 
 -1.44 -0.22 
region5 -0.033 -0.007 
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Table 10. Continued 
 -1.25 -0.39 
region6 -0.047 -0.008 
 -1.3 -0.32 
region7 -0.037 -0.012 
 -1.28 -0.6 
region8 -0.03 0.018 
 -0.84 -0.75 
MSA -0.001 -0.034 
 -0.06 (2.44)** 
highschool 0.008 -0.013 
 -0.15 -0.35 
C_EXP 0.002 0.002 
 (1.96)* (2.87)*** 
DB_SCORE 0.022 0.009 
 (2.63)*** -1.53 
U1 -0.08 -0.07 
 -1.18 -1.24 
ownerdel -0.07 -0.01 
 (1.92)* -0.43 
firmdel 0.11 0.129 
 (3.70)*** (6.40)*** 
U4 -0.012 0.017 
 -0.26 -0.55 
length 0 0 
 (3.15)*** (1.94)* 
Constant 0.357 0.674 
 (2.08)** (4.88)*** 
Observations 2434 2434 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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